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This paper derives an intertemporal optimality condition for economies with private information, focusing
on a class of recursive preferences.  By comparing it to the situation where agents can freely save in
a risk-free asset market, we derive the optimal savings distortions necessary for constrained optimality.
Our recursive preferences are homogeneous and satisfy a balanced growth condition, while allowing
us to separate the role of risk aversion and intertemporal elasticity of substitution.  We perform some
quantitative exercises that disentangle the respective roles played by these two parameters play in
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iwerning@mit.eduWith unfettered access to a risk-free asset, agents can perform the following variation to
their consumption plans. At any point in time, individuals can lower their current consumption
by one unit and increase it in all future periods and contingencies by a constant absolute
amount, equal to the net rate of return. At a market equilibrium, individuals ﬁnd themselves
at an optimum within this class of variations. The corresponding optimality condition is the
familiar intertemporal Euler equation.
Instead, a planner must consider the response that any change in the consumption plan
may have on work eﬀort, if the latter is not fully under her control due to private information.
In general, there exists a class of variations available to the planner on the agent’s consumption
such that incentives and work eﬀort are preserved. At the constrained-eﬃcient allocation, the
planner ﬁnds the optimum within this class of variations.
The variations available to the planner do not always, or even typically, coincide with those
available to agents in a free market equilibrium. Diﬀerence in these sets of variations leads to
optimality conditions that are potentially incompatible. Distortions on savings may then be
required to implement the constrained optimum with an asset market.
The ﬁrst point emphasized by this paper is that the particular form that the set of allowable
variations for the planner takes, depends critically on preferences. We begin by showing that
there exists a particular class of preferences for which the set of variations available to the
planner actually coincides with that available to agents in a free market. As a result, the
constrained eﬃcient allocation requires no distortions on agents’ savings. The preferences
required for this result feature no income eﬀects on work eﬀort and constant absolute risk
aversion. This particular result demonstrates that the form of the discrepancy between the
constrained-optimum and the market equilibrium is likely to depend, in general, on preference
assumptions.
Next, we propose a class of homogeneous preferences with a balanced growth condition on
work eﬀort that delivers a simple and intuitive class of variations. The allowable variations on
consumption for the planner in this case are as follows. At any point in time, the planner can
lower the agent’s current consumption and increase it in all future periods and contingencies
by a constant proportional amount. This type of variation is not available to the agent
through the asset market, which opens up the possibility for the planner to ﬁnd Pareto-
improvements. The optimal savings distortions are dictated by the diﬀerence between the
absolute and proportional variations on consumption available to the agent and planner,
respectively.
Proportional changes in consumption leave incentives unaltered precisely because prefer-
ences are homogeneous and satisfy a balanced growth condition. We believe that the simplicity
and plausibility of these variations is a desirable feature of the preferences we propose. They
2lead to simple intuitions, transparent theoretical results and a tractable framework for quan-
titative analysis.
Within this class of variations the resulting optimality condition is extremely simple. It
requires that the ratio of current utility to lifetime utility always equal the ratio of current
consumption to the expected present discounted value of lifetime consumption. We term this
simple optimality condition the Golden Ratio. It can also be stated as a Modiﬁed Inverse
Euler equation in a form that resembles the standard Inverse Euler equation that was derived
as a necessary condition for optimality for the variations considered in Farhi and Werning
(2006).
These preferences have three advantages. First, they are ﬂexible enough to allow us to
study the respective impact of two crucial parameters: the coeﬃcient of relative risk aver-
sion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Second, although they feature non-
separability of consumption and work eﬀort, these preferences call for no savings distortions
in the absence of recurring uncertainty – just as the separable preferences studied in the lit-
erature on the Inverse Euler equation. Third, they lead to a very clean separation result for
welfare gains between an idiosyncratic part and an aggregate part.
Towards the end of the paper, we perform some quantitative welfare exercises that compute
the gains from optimal savings distortions. We follow Farhi and Werning (2006), where we
developed a new approach to analyze the welfare gains from distorting savings and moving
away from letting individuals save freely. The method forgoes a complete solution for both
consumption and work eﬀort, and focuses, instead, entirely on consumption. We restrict our
attention to the case of geometric random walk consumption and constant work eﬀort. Our
main goal is to isolate and compare the eﬀects that the intertemporal elasticity of substitution
and the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion have on the size of the intertemporal wedge and the
welfare gains from optimal distortions. Thus, although we borrow from Farhi and Werning
(2006), the focus in that paper was on the generality in terms of the stochastic process for
the baseline allocation of consumption. Instead, our focus here is on a set of stylized baseline
allocations that allow us to clearly separate the impact of diﬀerent preferences assumptions.
Welfare gains depend crucially on four factors: the concavity of the production function,
the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1 and
the variance of consumption growth σ2
ǫ.
As in Farhi and Werning (2006), we ﬁnd that gains are decreasing in the concavity of the
production function. In partial equilibrium with a linear production function, gains can be
extremely large. By contrast, for an endowment economy welfare gains are zero under our
hypothesis of a geometric random walk consumption process. For the intermediate case of a
neoclassical production function, welfare gains are greatly mitigated.
3The steady state of the optimal allocation with saving distortions feature lower capital and
a higher interest rate then the corresponding steady state of the market equilibrium, where
the precautionary savings motive is at work. The variance of consumption growth and the
coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion control the strength of this motive and hence both the
interest rate increase and the decrease in capital between the baseline steady state and the
optimal steady state. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution on the other hand controls
the speed of the transition: the higher ρ−1, the faster the transition, and the higher the welfare
gains. The conﬁguration of these three parameters inﬂuences greatly the magnitude of the
welfare gains.
2 Constrained Eﬃciency vs. Free Savings
In this section we present a two period economy to introduce the basic concepts and set the
stage for the rest of the paper. Against this background, in the next section we turn to an
inﬁnite horizon economy with recursive preferences.
Consider a simple economy with two periods t = 0,1. There is no uncertainty at t = 0
but at the beginning of period t = 1 a state s1 ∈ S is realized; we assume S is ﬁnite, with #S
values and p(s) is the probability of outcome s1 = s. The agent consumes in the ﬁrst period
and consumes and works in the second. Let c0 denote consumption in the ﬁrst period and
(c1(s),Y1(s)) denote consumption and output as a function of the realized state in the second
period.
We adopt a general speciﬁcation of preferences and denote the agent’s utility functional
over allocations by U(c0,c1( ),Y1( )). Thus, U takes a scalar c0 and two functions c1( ) and
Y1( ) as inputs. As special benchmark case, one can assume the state s1 determines the
worker’s productivity and that the worker has an expected utility function u(c0,c1,e1) over










for some q > 0. Here, R = 1/q is the rate of return between periods 0 and 1.
42.1 Free Savings
First-best. The ﬁrst-best allocation simply maximizes utility subject only to technology equation (1).
At this allocation the ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption are given by
Uc0(c0,c1( ),Y1( )) = µ,
Uc1(s)(c0,c1( ),Y1( )) = qp(s)µ,
where µ is the multiplier on the resource constraint. The ﬁrst-order conditions for consumption
















Competitive equilibrium with free savings. The Euler equation equation (2) also ob-
tains in a free market economy where individuals have access to saving at rate of return R.
For example, suppose that agents live in an incomplete market setting, facing the budget
constraints
c0 + k1 ≤ 0, (4a)
c1(s) ≤ Y1(s) + Rk1 ∀s ∈ S. (4b)
Then the ﬁrst-order conditions for the agent’s utility maximization problem with respect to
savings k1 delivers equation equation (2).1 Note that the budgets constraints equation (4a)–
equation (4b) imply the resource constraint equation (1).
A general set-up. More generally, under what conditions does equation (2) hold? Consider
the abstract optimization problem of maximizing utility U(c0,c1( ),Y1( )) subject to
(c0,c1( ),Y1( )) ∈ F
for some constraint set F. This nests as special cases both the ﬁrst-best planning problem—
with F = Ffb deﬁned by the resource constraint equation (1)—and the agent’s optimization
1 Indeed, this result holds more generally, even if we assume that there are some taxes and transfers that
are a function of output or the state, so that we impose c1(s) ≤ T(Y1(s),s)+Y1(s)+Rk1 in the second period.
5in the free market setting—with F = Ffm deﬁned by the budget constraints equation (4a)–
equation (4b). Suppose that starting from any allocation (c0,c1( ),Y1( )) ∈ F it is possible to
deﬁne simple variations that maintain the allocation in F:
 
c0 − q∆,c1( ) + ∆,Y1( )
 
∈ F, (5)
for all ∆ in neighborhood of ∆ = 0. That is, a feasible allocation can be perturbed by decreas-
ing (increasing) consumption in the ﬁrst period, while increasing (decreasing) consumption in
parallel across all states s in the second period. Note that the same output allocation Y (s),
and hence eﬀort Y (s)/s, is maintained for all states s.
Property equation (5) holds for both the ﬁrst-best planning problem and the agent’s op-
timization problem in a free-market setting. More generally, whenever it is satisﬁed at an
optimum, then the generalized Euler condition equation (2) must be satisﬁed.
Second-best with private information. Consider next a private-information setting,
where the state s is observed only by the agent. By the revelation principle, the best the
planner can do is to request a report r ∈ S from the agent regarding s ∈ S and assign con-
sumption and output in the second period accordingly. Without loss in generality, one can
assume that telling the truth is optimal.
Let r = σ(s) denote a reporting strategy for the agent, mapping true states of the world
s ∈ S into reports r ∈ S. Let Σ denote the set of all strategies. The truth-telling strategy is
denoted by σ∗(s) = s for all s ∈ S. An agent using strategy σ ∈ Σ obtains (cσ
1(s),Y σ
1 (s)) =
(c1(σ(s)),Y1(σ(s))) in state s. Incentive-compatibility can be expressed as




1 ( )) ∀σ ∈ Σ. (6)
The second-best planning problem corresponds to the case where F = Fsb deﬁned by equation (1)
and equation (6). A second-best optimum maximizes utility subject to selecting an allocation
in Fsb.
In this general context, typically property equation (5) with Fsb fails. The next proposition,
however, provides an example where it holds.
Proposition 1. Let U(c0,c1( ),Y1( )) = ˆ U
 
c0,c1( )−v(Y1( ), )
 
where ˆ U monotone in its sec-
ond argument. Then property equation (5) holds for Fsb for all feasible allocations (c0,c1( ),Y1( )) ∈
Fsb.
Proof. The result follows by noting that incentive compatibility equation (6) holds if and only
if
c(s) − v(Y (s),s) ≥ c(r) − v(Y (r),s) ∀r,s ∈ S,
6which is independent of c0 and invariant to the operation of exchanging c( ) for c( ) + ∆ for
any ∆.
If property equation (5) holds for all ∆ (not just in a neighborhood around ∆ = 0) then
it is without loss of generality to allow agents to freely save, in the sense that the planner
can allow the agent to select the value for ∆ in this variation. It follows that, for the class
of preferences identiﬁed by the proposition, the planner can allow the agent to save freely,
without distortions, at the technological rate of return R = 1/q. The economic interpretation
of the quasi-linear speciﬁcation c − v(Y ;s) is that there are no income eﬀects on work eﬀort.
Savings from the ﬁrst period do not then aﬀect the choice between work eﬀort and earnings.
As a result, they do not disturb incentive compatibility and property equation (5) holds.
An equivalent way of postulating property equation (5) is as follows. Any direct mechanism
(c0 − q∆,c1(r) + ∆,Y1(r)) essentially oﬀers the agent an ex-post menu in each state s equal
to the loci of points (c1( ) + ∆,Y1( )). In each state s, the agent selects an optimal point
on this menu, (c∗
1,Y ∗
1 ). Property equation (5) then amounts to assuming that this optimum
Y ∗
1 is invariant to ∆. Proposition 1 then identiﬁes the largest class of preferences that can
guarantee that this is the case for all feasible allocations.
2.2 Distorted Savings
From the previous subsection, we know that the variations that result from free savings do
not generally preserve incentive compatibility. In this situation, what can we say about the
desirability of free savings? We approach this question in two complementary ways.
A Lagrangian approach. The ﬁrst is to attach Lagrange multiplier µ(σ) on the incentive
constraints equation (6), leading to an optimality condition that includes the eﬀect that ∆


























Note that if all the incentive constraints are slack, so that µ(σ) = 0 for all σ ∈ Σ, then
this expression boils down to the Euler equation equation (2). Otherwise, the Euler equa-
tion equation (2) will typically not hold. Indeed, if one signs the term −qUc0(c0,c1(σ( )),Y1(σ( )))+
 
s∈S Uc1(s)(c0,c1(σ( )),Y1(σ( ))) for diﬀerent strategies σ and characterizes which multipliers
are nonzero, then one can sign the intertemporal wedge required in the Euler equation.
7Feasible variations. Another line of attack is to ﬁnd a diﬀerent variation, that does pre-
serve incentive compatibility, without changing work eﬀort. This leads to an intertemporal
optimality condition that does not involve Lagrange multipliers. One can then compare this
optimality condition with the Euler equation equation (2).
The idea is to ﬁnd a variation function δ(∆,s) on consumption in the second period that
depends on the realized state s so that:
 
c0 + ∆,c1( ) + δ(∆, ),Y1( )
 
∈ F, (7)
in a neighborhood of ∆ = 0. At an optimum we must then have that










δ(0,s) = 0 (8)
For example, with expected utility and u(c0,c1,e1) = ˆ u(c0,c1) − h(e1) a variation that is
feasible is to set δ(∆,s) so that
ˆ u
 






+ A(∆) ∀s ∈ S (9)
where A(∆) is such that  
s∈S
(∆ + δ(∆,s))p(s) = 0. (10)
This variation shifts utility in a parallel way across states s ∈ S. It preserves incentive
compatibility because these parallel shifts cancel each other out on both sides of equation (6).














which is known as the Inverse Euler equation. By Jensen’s inequality, this condition is in-
compatible with the Euler equation equation (3), except in the special case where there is no
uncertainty in the marginal rate of substitution ratio ˆ uc0(c0,c1(s))/ˆ uc1(c0,c1(s)). Without un-
certainty the optimality of no intertemporal distortions follows from Atkinson-Stiglitz’s (1976)
result on uniform taxation, which requires separability between consumption and eﬀort, as
assumed in this case.
8Logarithmic balanced-growth preferences. Within this class of preferences, an inter-
esting special case with several advantages is the logarithmic balanced growth speciﬁcation
u(c0,c1) = log(c0) + β log(c1). In this case the variations induce parallel multiplicative shifts
over second-period consumption:
δ(∆,s) = ¯ δ(∆)c1(s), (13)
for some ¯ δ(∆). Intuitively, incentives are provided by proportional rewards and punishments.
If consumption is scaled up or down by a constant it does not change the incentives for work
eﬀort.
In this case, unlike the preference class described in Proposition 1, income eﬀects for
work eﬀort are nonzero. Proportional variations are feasible precisely because of the balanced
growth condition, that implies that income and substitution exactly cancel each other.
This logarithmic case seems economically appealing, because of the primitives and the
simple proportional variations it permits. One simple generalization of this case, is to the
expected utility case where
u(c0,c1,e1) = ˜ u(c0) + β˜ u(c1)h(e1) (14)
and where ˜ u(c) = c1−α/(1 − α). This class of preferences also satisﬁes a balanced growth
condition. It is easily veriﬁed that once again the feasible variations are proportional in
consumption, as in equation (13).
In the next section we extend this class to an inﬁnite horizon economy. Preferences that
lead to the feasibility of proportional variations turn out to be very tractable. In particular,
they lead to a very simple optimality condition. Within a class of baseline allocations, the
optimum is easily identiﬁed and its welfare improvements quantiﬁed.
3 Recursive Preferences
We now turn to an inﬁnite horizon and introduce a class of recursive preferences that are
homogeneous in the consumption process and separate risk aversion from the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution as in (Epstein and Zin, 1989). Consumption and work-eﬀort are not
assumed to be separable, but satisfy a balanced-growth condition.
For this class of preferences, we provide simple variations on consumption that maintain
incentive compatibility. The variations involve proportional shifts in consumption that do not
aﬀect incentives. Both the homogeneity and the balanced-growth speciﬁcation on preferences
are crucial for this result.
9Based on these variations we derive the intertemporal optimality condition at the end of
the section. The condition is shown to be incompatible with allowing agents to freely save. In
this way, an intertemporal wedge on savings is present at the optimal allocation. Thus, some
form of distortions on savings are required in any tax implementation of the optimum. In
the next section we explore the welfare gains from adhering to this condition for some simple
cases.
Our preferences do not satisfy the separability condition required for Atkinson-Stiglitz’s
uniform taxation theorem. Despite this, it is optimal in the absence of uncertainty to set the
intertemporal distortions to zero. Thus, for these preferences, optimal distortions in savings
arise from ongoing idiosyncratic uncertainty, just as in the additively separable expected-utility
case that leads to the Inverse Euler condition.
3.1 Moral Hazard
We build on the following simple static moral-hazard model. At the beginning of the period,
the agent ﬁrst exerts eﬀort a, which is not observable by the planner. The state of nature
s is then realized from the distribution P(s|a). The planner observes s and gives the agent










We suppose the agent’s utility U(c) is a power function. This speciﬁcation satisﬁes the stan-
dard balanced-growth assumption, for which income and substitution eﬀects cancel out. An














represents the certainty-equivalent obtained from the random consumption c(s).
For our dynamic setting, we proceed analogously. At the start of period t the worker
chooses eﬀort at−1, then the state st is realized and observed and the planner allocates con-
sumption c(st). Eﬀort aﬀects the distribution of state st and lowers utility by a factor h(at) ≤ 1



















represents lifetime-certainty-equivalent consumption, with
CE = R
−1ER (16)
is the certainty equivalent function and
W(c, ˆ v) ≡ u
−1((1 − β)u(c) + βu(ˆ v)) (17)
is a time aggregator, mapping current consumption and future utility into a constant-consumption
equivalent.
With this representation of preferences, one can easily see the analogy with the simple
static setting. By a change of variables, however, the same preferences can be represented
in the following, more convenient, way. For any given eﬀort plan a ≡ {a(st)}, an allocation













Incentive compatibility of c, v and a∗ requires a∗ to maximize initial lifetime utility
va∗(s0) ≥ va(s0) ∀a. (19)






Otherwise, a plan that follows a∗ up to st and then switches to the actions prescribed by a at
and after st would be preferable to a∗. That is, Bellman’s Principle of Optimality applies to
the agent’s dynamic program.
We now consider variations in the consumption process that maintain incentive compati-
bility. After history sτ the consumption sequence is just shifted proportionally, and this does
not aﬀect incentives. At sτ we shift consumption to compensate, so that incentives are not
aﬀected in period τ and earlier periods. The key property we use is homogeneity of W(c,v′)
and of CE.
Proposition 2. Assume u(x) = x1−ρ/(1−ρ) and R(x) = x1−γ/(1−γ) with ρ,γ ≥ 0. Suppose




   
   
∆ c(sτ) for st = sτ
∆′c(st) for t > τ and st ≻ sτ
c(st) otherwise
Then for any ∆′ there exists a ∆ such that ˜ c, ˜ v and a∗ satisfy conditions (18) and (19).
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Hence, we have that
˜ va(s
τ) ≤ ˜ va∗(s
τ) = va∗(s
τ) for all a,
a∗ is optimal from period τ onward and delivers the same continuation utility as previously.
For any plan a deﬁne an alternative plan ˆ a that switches to a∗ from period τ onward:
ˆ a(st) = a(st) for t < τ and ˆ a(st) = a∗(st) for t ≥ τ. The result above implies that
˜ va(s0) ≤ ˜ vˆ a(s0) = vˆ a(s0) ≤ va∗(s0) = ˜ va∗(s0). (21)
That is, ˆ a dominates a and yields the same utility as without the variation, which in turn
is dominated by the recommended action a∗ which also yields the same utility as after the
variation. This establishes that a∗ remains incentive compatible.
123.2 Private Information: A Dynamic Mirrleesian Economy
Here we build on Mirrlees’ static private information model. At the beginning of the period,
the agent privately observes productivity θ. The agent then makes a report r and the planner










where r = σ(θ) is the agent’s reporting strategy. We suppose the agent’s utility U(c) is
a power function. This speciﬁcation satisﬁes the standard balanced-growth assumption, for
which income and substitution eﬀects cancel out.
For our dynamic setting, we assume the following structure of uncertainty. At the begin-
ning of the period a state st is realized and publicly observed by the agent and planner. Then
θt is realized and observed only by the agent. To simplify we assume that st and θt take on
a ﬁnite number of values. After observing the shock θt the agent makes a report rt regarding
it to the planner. We collect the variables observed by the planner by zt = (st,rt) and their
histories by zt = (st,rt).














where zt+1 = (st+1,σt+1(zt,θt+1)).
We let σ∗ denote the truth-telling strategy σ∗
t(zt,θt) = θt. Incentive compatibility requires
vσ∗(z0,θ0) ≥ vσ(z0,θ0) ∀σ. (23)
The proof of the next result is in the appendix.
Proposition 3. Assume u(x) = x1−ρ/(1 − ρ) and R(x) = x1−γ/(1 − γ). For any allocation




   
   
∆ c(zτ) for zt = ˆ zτ
∆′c(zt) for t > τ and zt ≻ ˆ zτ
c(zt) otherwise
Then for any ∆′ there exists a ∆ such that (˜ c,h,˜ v) satisfy (22) and (23) if: (a) Conditional
on st, the realization of θt is independent and identically distributed; or (b) ρ = 1 so that
u(x) = logx.
We do not impose restrictions on the stochastic process for the observable state st. Re-
13garding the unobservable shock, the requirement in part (a) does not restrict the process
for productivity, and can, in particular, accommodate any degree of persistence. What this
requirement does ensure is that the states that aﬀect the evolution of shocks are observable,
that there are no hidden states. Although this implies that the observable state st is a suf-
ﬁcient statistic for (st,θt), in the sense that Pr(st+n,θt+n|st,θt) = Pr(st+n,θt+n|st), optimal
allocations typically depend on the history θt. In this way, the history of reports rt is rele-
vant. False past reports may then aﬀect the allocation the agent receives, but do not aﬀect
the planner’s capacity to predict the agent’s future productivity. This tractability allows us
to ﬁnd variations that maintain incentive compatibility.








Hence, setting ∆1−β(∆′)β = 1 in the variations does not aﬀect the utility delivered by any
reporting strategy. As a result, no assumption on the structure of uncertainty is required.
3.3 The Intertemporal Optimality Condition: The Golden Ratio
or The Modiﬁed Inverse Euler Equation
Let us say that an allocation is eﬃcient if it minimizes the present value of consumption
E
 ∞
t=0 qtct and delivers a given lifetime utility level in an incentive compatible way. Then
any eﬃcient allocation cannot be improved by the variations above. That is, these variations
cannot reduce the discounted value of consumption.
Fix a node ˆ sτ. Increase consumption at ˆ sτ proportionally by ∆, and increase consumption
at all nodes that follow it, st ≻ ˆ sτ, proportionally by ∆′. This variation is permitted by the
propositions above. Indexing the variation by ∆′ and solving for ∆ = δ(∆′) that keeps utility
























Thus, optimality requires the ratio of current to lifetime utility (1 − β)u(ct)/u(vt) to be
equated to the ratio of current consumption with its expected present value ct/
 ∞
s=0 qsEt[ct+s].
14Rearranging, the ratio of current consumption and utility must be equated to the ratio of the








Both conditions formalize the optimality of a form of consumption smoothing. We call them
the Golden Ratio conditions.
The next result reexpresses the optimality condition above in a way that is more suitable
for comparison with the optimality condition – the Euler equation – that results when agents




















(b) If agents can borrow and save freely at the interest rate q−1, then the allocation must satisfy













Savings will generally be distorted at the optimal allocation, since the Modiﬁed Inverse
Euler equation and the Euler equation are incompatible. Thus, in any implementation of the
planner’s optimum, agents cannot be allowed to borrow and save freely at the interest rate
1/q.
Suppose that the optimality condition equation (28) holds. Deﬁne the intertemporal wedge
τ by solving for the factor (1− τ) required so that the Euler equation (29) holds when 1/q is
replaced with (1 − τ)/q:




































Importantly, the intertemporal wedge τ is zero whenever there is no uncertainty. For the case
of certainty, Atkinson-Stiglitz’s uniform-taxation result requires preferences to be separable
15between consumption and leisure. However, in our recursive speciﬁcation preferences are not
separable. Interestingly, despite this, the absence of resolution of uncertainty between two
periods implies that there should be no intertemporal distortion on savings there. In other
words, although the separibility conditions required by Atkinson-Stiglitz are violated, their
uniform commodity taxation result holds under certainty with our preferences. Thus, optimal
distortions can be entirely attributed to ongoing idiosyncratic uncertainty, just as in the
additively separable expected-utility case that leads to the Inverse Euler equation (Golosov
et al., 2003).
Note that if γ = 1 one gets that τ > 0, guaranteeing that the intertemporal distortion
on savings is positive. Another interesting case is when ct is a geometric random walk at the
baseline allocation, so that ct+1 = εt+1ct. It then follows that vt is proportional to ct, and
τ > 0. We shall study this case in more detail in the next section.
3.4 Constant Absolute Risk Aversion Preferences
In this subsection, we show that for a particular class of preferences with constant absolute
risk aversion the optimal distortion on savings is zero. In a static moral-hazard setting, a
convenient speciﬁcation of preferences is
E[U(c − h(a))|a] (32)
where U(x) = −e−αx is exponential. Equivalently, one can express ex ante utility as
CE[c − h(a)|a] (33)
In our dynamic setting, we generalize this speciﬁcation as follows. Let u(x) = −e−ρx and












where W(c,v′) = u−1((1−β)u(c)+βu(v′)) and CE = R−1ER. Incentive compatibility requires
inequalities (19) as before. The next proposition is proved in the appendix.
Proposition 5. Assume u(x) = −e−ρx and R(x) = −e−γx. Suppose we have c, v and a∗




   
   
c(sτ) + ∆ for st = sτ
c(st) + ∆′ for t > τ and st ≻ sτ
c(st) otherwise
Then for any ∆′ there exists a ∆ such that ˜ c, ˜ v and a∗ satisfy conditions (18) and (19).








required to deliver a given lifetime utility level in an incentive compatible way. Then any
eﬃcient allocation cannot be improved by the variations above. That is, these variations
cannot reduce the net present value of consumption.
Indexing the variation at any node by ∆′ and solving for ∆ that keeps utility constant we
can write the minimization subproblem as in (24). In this case, the ﬁrst-order necessary and
suﬃcient condition coincides with the condition obtained if the worker could save and borrow
freely at a market interest rate q−1.
Proposition 6. The optimum in (24) corresponds to the economy where agents can borrow






′(CE(ct+1 − ht)). (36)
Hence, for the CARA preferences under consideration, the constrained-optimality condi-
tion and the Euler equation coincide.
4 Welfare Gains: Quantitative Explorations
In this section, we investigate the welfare gains from the optimal savings distortions derived in
Section 3. The analysis proceeds along the lines of Farhi and Werning (2006). We focus on the
case where the baseline allocation features a geometric random walk consumption process while
work eﬀort is constant. The analysis in this section covers both to the private-information
and moral-hazard settings.
Assumption 1. The baseline allocation {ct,ht} is such that ht = ¯ h is constant and ct is a
geometric random walk ct+1 = ctεt+1 with εt+1 identically and independently distributed over
time.
174.1 Partial equilibrium
Let us ﬁrst assume that there is a linear technology to transfer resources from period to period
with a gross rate of return R = q−1.
The following proposition shows that if the baseline allocation is a pure geometric random
walk and ht is constant, then the cost minimizing allocation attainable through our variations
is also a pure geometric random walk.
Proposition 7. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the cost minimizing allocation {˜ ct}
is obtained by multiplying {ct} by a deterministic drift g−1:























where ˆ β = β¯ h1−ρ.
Hence the optimal allocation ˜ ct attainable from the baseline allocation through our varia-
tions is such that ˜ ct also follows a geometric random walk, but with a diﬀerent drift g−1E[ε] in-
stead of E[ε] for the baseline allocation. This new drift ensures that the constrained-optimality
condition—a necessary and suﬃcient condition for optimality within our class of variations—
holds at the optimal allocation ˜ ct. Note that β and ¯ h1−ρ play exactly similar roles in this
formula: when ht = ¯ h is constant, ¯ h acts as a discount factor. This eﬀect is compounded with
β to produce an eﬀective discount factor ˆ β = β¯ h1−ρ. It is also useful to note that if g > 1,
then α > 1 and vice versa.
Increasing g while maintaining the value of qE[ε] is exactly equivalent to decreasing the
eﬀective discount factor ˆ β. In other words, the higher g, the lower the eﬀective discount factor
ˆ β that makes the constrained-optimality condition hold.
Note also that given qE[ε] and g, the intercept α depends only on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution parameter ρ. The risk aversion parameter γ only shifts the eﬀective
discount factor ˆ β required for the constrained-optimality condition to hold.
Economists are used to thinking of the discount factor as a primitive of the model, and
as the equilibrium interest rate as an outcome. However, contrary to interest rates, discount
factors are not directly observable. In fact, most of the evidence concerning discount factors
comes from equilibrium values of interest rates. Therefore, in the formula for the intercept
α, we prefer to think of the equilibrium interest rate q as the primitive and to solve for the
eﬀective discount factor ˆ β that makes the constrained-optimality condition hold given g and
qE[ε].





Note that the wedge is always positive. Its magnitude in this example is independent of ρ
and is entirely determined by γ, that is by the agent’s attitude toward risk. This highlights
that the origin of the wedge is the combination of two factors: the riskiness of tomorrow’s
consumption from today’s perspective and the agent’s risk aversion. Absent shocks, there
would be no reason to distort savings and the Euler equation would hold. Similarly, if the
agent were risk neutral, there would be no reason to distort savings and the wedge would also
be zero.
We can re-express the wedge using the formalism of cumulants: let m be the moment
generating function of log(ε) :
m(θ) = logE[exp(θlog(ε))] = logE[ε
θ]
The nth cumulant of log(ε) is given by κn ≡ dnm
dθn (0). Cumulants are closely related to
moments, as we see from the ﬁrst four: κ1 = µ1, κ2 = µ2, κ3 = µ3, κ4 = µ4 − 3(µ2)2. The
notation is standard, with µ1 denoting the conditional mean of log(ε) and µn, for n ≥ 1 ,
denoting the nth central conditional moment.
Using this notation we derive a formula that ties the wedge to the higher order moments
or cumulants of log(ε):




n − (1 − γ)
n)
In the lognormal case, which we explore below, the higher cumulants κn of log(ε) are zero for
n ≥ 3 and we obtain a closed form for the wedge which depends only on the variance σ2
ε of
log(ε): −log(1 − τ) = γσ2
ε.
Outside of the lognormal case, higher cumulants are non-zero and higher moments of the
distribution of consumption growth rates aﬀect the wedge. For example, we can analyze the
impact of skewness κ3. The contribution of this term to the wedge is given by κ3
γ(1−γ)
2 . Hence
negative skewness – κ3 – decreases the wedge if γ < 1 and increases the wedge if γ > 1.










Combining these two expressions, we can derive the relative reduction in expected discounted
cost allowed by our variations.
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds. Then the relative expected discounted cost














By homogeneity, the ratio of the cost of the optimal allocation to the cost of the baseline
does not depend on the current level of consumption c. Given the cost of the baseline allocation,
or in other words, given qE[ε], g is a suﬃcient statistic for the welfare gains attainable through
the variations. It is therefore instructive to perform some comparative statics with respect to
g.
Given qE[ε] and g, the relative expected cost reduction depends only on the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution parameter ρ. This is a direct consequence of the fact noted above
that given g and qE[ε], the intercept α does not depend on the risk aversion parameter.
At g = 1, the reduction in cost is 0. This is because in this case, the constrained-optimality
condition holds at the baseline allocation. Moreover, a Taylor expansion around g = 1 reveals










When g goes to inﬁnity on the other hand, the cost reduction goes to 1
1−qE[ε]. Taking g to
inﬁnity is like taking the eﬀective discount factor to 0. In that case, the optimal allocation for
∆−1 = 1 is
˜ ct = 0 for t ≥ 1 and ˜ c0 = c0.














which is exactly the expression derived in Farhi and Werning (2006).
Euler at the baseline. Given the importance of g, we now investigate its main determinants
in the interesting case where the Euler equation holds at the baseline allocation. That the






























1−γ   γ−ρ
1−γ (38)
The eﬀective discount factor ˆ β = β¯ h1−ρ can then be determined:






1−γ   ρ−γ
1−γ
Knowing ˆ β, the suﬃcient statistic g for the welfare gains in formula (37) can be derived
using the formula in Proposition (7).











1−γ  −1  1
ρ
.
The optimal change in drift g is positively related to the wedge τ: g = (1 − τ)−1/ρ. The
wedge reﬂects the strength of the precautionary savings motive: the higher the wedge, the
larger the gains from frontloading consumption. The higher the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution, the more agents are willing to accept reductions in consumption in the future
for inceased consumption today. The two eﬀects combined determine the optimal change in
drift g.
When ε is lognormally distributed logε ∼ N(µ,σ2
ε), then the wedge τ, the change in drift
from the baseline allocation g and the welfare gains can be computed in terms of the mean µ
and the variance σ2
ε of consumption growth:
Corollary 1. Suppose that ε is lognormally distributed logε ∼ N(µ,σ2
ε), then τ and g are
given by
τ = 1 −
E[ε1−γ]
E[ε]E[ε−γ]
























As we already discussed, the wedge is increasing in the degree of risk aversion γ and in the
magnitude of the shocks σ2
ε. Moreover, γ and σ2
ε aﬀect the wedge in a complementary way.
When shocks are lognormal, the formula takes the remarkably simple form τ = 1−exp[−γσ2
ε].
21The crucial parameter g is associated with
γ
ρσ2
ε. The higher the variance of the shocks, and
the higher risk aversion, the higher the required change in drift g between the baseline and
the optimum. Similarly, the higher the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1, the higher
g.
Intuitively, this can be seen by taking the limit as ρ goes to 0, so that consumption at
diﬀerent dates become perfect substitutes. The Euler equation and the optimality condition
are incompatible in the limit where ρ goes to 0, since the required change in drift g goes to
inﬁnity. Note however that in this case, the intercept α converges to 1−q(E[ε−γ])
−1E[ε1−γ].
Intuitively, when ρ goes to 0, it is optimal to front-load consumption more and more. In
the limit, it is best to deliver all consumption in the ﬁrst period so that agents are entirely
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qe 
1 − qe γσ
2
ε
The gains are increasing in the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1: intuitively, as
consumption at diﬀerent dates become more substitutable, it becomes easier to compensate
the agent for a decrease in the drift in consumption in order to lower his exposure to risk. In











From this formula it is apparent that at the ﬁrst relevant order, risk aversion and the in-
tertemporal elasticity of substitution enter the formula for the gains only through
γ2
ρ .
Quantitative exploration. Figure 1 and 2 plot the reciprocal of the relative cost reduction
using equation equation (37) as a measure of the relative welfare gains as a function of σ2
ε.
The ﬁgures use an empirically relevant range for σ2
ε which is taken to vary between 0 and
0.007. The value of qE[ε] is set to 0.97.
In ﬁgure 1, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1 is set to 1 and the diﬀerent
curves correspond to diﬀerent values of the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient γ ranging from
1 to 3 in increments of 0.5. The gains are increasing in γ: Increasing γ by 10% is exactly
equivalent to increasing σ2
ε by 10%.
In Figure 2, the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient γ is set to 1, and the diﬀerent curves
correspond to diﬀerent values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1 ranging from
0.5 to 1 in increments of 0.1. The gains are increasing in ρ−1. Increasing ρ−1 by 10% is roughly
equivalent to increasing σ2
ε by 5%.












Figure 1: Welfare gains as a function of σ2
ε. Baseline consumption is a geometric random walk
and ht is constant. The Euler equation holds. The diﬀerent curves correspond to diﬀerent
values of ˆ σ ranging from 1 to 3.
Two lessons emerge from our simple exercise. First, welfare gains range from small to
potentially large. Second, they depend a lot on three parameters of the model: γ, ρ and σ2
ε.
The coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ and the variance of consumption growth σ2
ε play an
especially important role over the range consistent with the available empirical evidence con-
cerning these two parameters. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1 is important,
but its inﬂuence over the empirically relevant range is somewhat less dramatic. This is both
because the range for this parameter is smaller and because ρ−1 enters with a smaller power
than γ and σ2
ε as can be seen from (39).
4.2 General equilibrium
Up to now we have restricted the analysis to partial equilibrium. Alternatively, one can think
of the results we have derived so far as applying to an economy facing some given constant rate
of return to capital. In Farhi and Werning (2006), we argue that neglecting general equilibrium
eﬀects magniﬁes the welfare gains from reforming the consumption allocation. Here we explore
the joint inﬂuence of risk aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution on general
equilibrium welfare gains.
Planning problem. Consider a baseline allocation {ct,ht}. In order to setup the planning
problem, it is useful to introduce the following notation: let Υ({ct,ht},∆−1) be the set of
allocations ˜ ct attainable through our variations from the baseline allocation {∆−1ct,ht}. Note
that the shifted allocation {∆−1ct,ht} is incentive compatible and delivers a value lifetime
utility increased by a multiplicative factor ∆−1 to the agent. In general equilibrium, the









Figure 2: Welfare gains as a function of σ2
ε when baseline consumption is a geometric random
walk and ht is constant. The diﬀerent curves correspond to diﬀerent values of ρ−1 ranging
from 0.5 to 0.9.
planning problem can be set-up as
W(K0) = max
{˜ ct, ˜ Kt+1}
˜ v0 (40)
subject to
˜ vt = ht
 











for t = 0,1,...
{˜ ct} ∈ Υ({ct,ht},∆−1),
˜ Kt+1 + E[˜ ct] ≤ F( ˜ Kt, ˜ Nt) + (1 − δ) ˜ Kt for t = 0,1,...
˜ K0 = K0.























 for t = 0,1,...
Of course, we have W(K0) = ∆−1W where W is the welfare achieved at the baseline
allocation and ∆−1 is the maximand in ( 40).
Note that we can always decompose ˜ ct = ˜ ci
t ˜ Ct with the property that E[˜ ci
t] = 1 and
˜ Ct = E[˜ ct], where the superscript i stands for idiosyncratic. Since our variations allow for
deterministic parallel shifts in consumption, we have that {˜ ct} ∈ Υ({ct,ht},∆−1) for some
24∆−1 if and only if {˜ ci
t} ∈ Υ({ci
t,ht},∆−1).
The analysis of this planning problem is tackled in full generality in Farhi and Werning
(2006), where we also explore non geometric random walk baseline allocations: we provide
cases where (40) can be separated into two diﬀerent planning problems, one involving only
the idiosyncratic part of the allocation ˜ ci
t and the other only the aggregate part ˜ Ct. Here
instead, we focus on the special case were the baseline allocation features geometric random
walk consumption with constant ht.
Geometric random walk with constant ht. Suppose that the baseline allocation features
geometric random walk consumption with constant ht and constant aggregate consumption:
ct+1 = ctεt+1 and ht = ¯ h,
where εt+1 is independently and identically distributed across agents and time and with







1−γ   1−ρ
1−γ and ˆ βε ≡ ¯ h
1−ρβε.
Proposition 10. Suppose that Assumption 1 holds and E[ε] =1. The solution to (40) is
˜ ct = ˜ Ctci
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˜ Kt+1 + ˜ Ct ≤ F( ˜ Kt, ˜ Nt) + (1 − δ) ˜ Kt for t = 0,1,...
˜ K0 = K0.
The property that the idiosyncratic component of the baseline allocation is already optimal
relies crucially on the assumption of geometric random walk with constant ht. Intuitively, as
we saw above, the planner only wants to aﬀect the drift of {˜ ci
t}, which is impossible in the
case of an endowment economy where 1 = E[˜ ci
t].
In the case where the baseline allocation is a geometric random walk with constant ht, we
can therefore restrict our attention to the aggregate part of the allocation: all the potential
welfare gains come from modifying the aggregate component of the allocation.
Euler equation at the baseline. Suppose that in addition, the baseline allocation repre-
sents a steady state where the Euler equation holds.
25ρ−1 = 0.5 ρ−1 = 0.75 ρ−1 = 1
δWPE δWGE ˜ rSS δWPE δWGE ˜ rSS δWPE δWGE ˜ rSS
γ = 1 2.02% 0.09% 3.82% 1.56% 0.10% 3.82% 1.07% 0.10% 3.82%
γ = 2 3.62% 0.34% 4.55% 5.15% 0.37% 4.55% 6.53% 0.38% 5.28%
γ = 3 7.03% 0.69% 5.28% 9.85% 0.75% 5.28% 12.33% 0.79% 5.28%
Table 1: Welfare Gains.
Let qSS = (1 − δ + FK(KSS,NSS))
−1 be the inverse of the steady state interest rate. In
that case, we can derive as above an expression for ˆ βε:














That the baseline allocation is a steady state implies in particular that E[ε] =1. We can
therefore simplify the formula for ˆ βε:




The optimal allocation will eventually reach a steady state where the inverse of the interest
rate ˜ qSS is given by ˜ qSS = ˆ βε.
When ε is lognormally distributed logε ∼ N(µ,σ2
ε), then we can compute ˆ βε and ˜ qSS in
terms of µ and σ2
ε. We get the remarkably simple formula:







Equation (42) shows that the new interest rate is higher than the initial interest rate (that
is, ˜ KSS < KSS) by a factor given by exp(γσ2
ε). The higher risk aversion and the variance
of consumption growth, the higher the increase in steady state interest rates, and the higher
the reduction in steady state capital stock. Because the baseline allocation has no trend, the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution does not aﬀect the level of the new interest rate ˜ q
−1
SS.
The only thing our variations allow in this case is to correct the externality created by the
precautionary savings motive, the intensity of which is controlled only by the relative risk
aversion γ and the variance of consumption growth σ2
ε.
As we just discussed, the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion γ and the variance of con-
sumption growth σ2
ε control the decrease in capital between the baseline steady state and the
optimal steady state. The intertemporal elasticity of substitution, on the other hand, controls
the speed of the transition: the higher ρ−1, the faster the transition, and the higher the welfare
gains.
26We now compute the welfare gains in general equilibrium for the neoclassical production
function F(K,N) = KαN1−α + (1 − δ)K. We set α = 0.36, δ = .09. We set the variance
of consumption growth at the highest end of the values we used in our partial equilibrium
computations: σ2
ε = 0.007. We take the initial interest rate at the baseline allocation to be
rSS = q
−1
SS − 1 = 3.07%. We perform the computations of welfare gains for three diﬀerent
values of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1—0.5, 0.75 and 1—and three diﬀerent
values for the relative risk aversion coeﬃcient γ—1, 2 and 3. For each conﬁguration of these
parameters, we report the welfare gains in partial equilibrium δWPE if the interest rate were
ﬁxed at rSS, the welfare gains in general equilibrium δWGE and the interest rate ˜ rSS at the
new steady state for the optimal allocation.
An important general lesson from this exercise, as pointed out in Farhi and Werning
(2006), is that taking into account the concavity of the production function—that is, taking
into account general equilibrium eﬀects—greatly mitigates the welfare gains. This is because
in general equilibrium, reducing the drift of the consumption process—the optimal policy
under partial equilibrium—yields lower and lower gains as consumption and capital go down
over time and the equilibrium interest rate increases. As a consequence, it is optimal to reduce
the drift diﬀerential. Eventually, under the optimal allocation, the drift diﬀerential goes to 0
and the economy reaches the new steady state with a higher interest rate and a lower capital
stock.
Even though the partial equilibrium welfare gains can be as high as 12.33% , the general
equilibrium welfare gains never go above 0.79%. The highest gains are reached for the highest
value of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution ρ−1 = 1 and the highest value of the
relative risk aversion coeﬃcient γ = 3. For those parameter values, the new interest rate is
substantially higher than the initial interest rate: ˜ rSS = 5.28% whereas rSS = 3.07%. Despite
this large diﬀerence in interest rates and therefore in steady state capital stocks, the general
equilibrium welfare gains are moderate at 0.79%.
5 Conclusion
This paper studied constrained eﬃcient allocations in private information economies. We
focused on how the optimal savings distortions featured in those allocations depend on indi-
viduals’ preferences. We introduced a recursive class of preferences that allowed a separation
of risk aversion from intertemporal substitution, and derived general results on the nature of
optimal distortions.
We then performed a quantitative investigation for a class of geometric random walk
consumption allocations. We showed that savings distortion depend only on risk aversion and
27the variance of the shocks to consumption. However, the welfare gains from these distortions
depend on both parameters, although we found greater sensitivity to risk aversion.
The purpose of the quantitative exercise was to illustrate the role preferences, but it was
limited in terms of the consumption allocations it considered. In Farhi and Werning (2006)
we undertake a comprehensive exploration of savings distortions and welfare gains for general
consumption processes.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
Part (a). The proof parallels the proof of Proposition 2 closely. First note that since prefer-
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t) for t ≥ τ and z
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So that vσ∗(ˆ zτ,θτ) = ˜ vσ∗(ˆ zτ,θτ) for all θτ. Using the recursion equation (22), the inequal-
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28Collecting the inequalities, we have shown that in period τ
˜ vσ(z
τ,θ




t) for all z
τ,θ
t,σ,
Thus, σ∗ is optimal from period τ onward and delivers the same continuation utility as pre-
viously.
For any plan σ deﬁne an alternative plan ˆ σ that starts at σ and then switches to σ∗ from
period τ onward: ˆ σt(zτ,θt) = σt(zτ,θt) for t < τ and ˆ σt(zτ,θt) = σ∗
t(zτ,θt) for t ≥ τ. The
result above implies that
˜ vσ(z0,θ0) ≤ ˜ vˆ σ(z0,θ0) = vˆ σ(z0,θ0) ≤ vσ∗(z0,θ0) = ˜ vσ∗(z0,θ0). (44)
That is, ˆ σ dominates σ and yields the same utility as without the variation, which in turn
is dominated by the recommended action σ∗ which also yields the same utility as after the
variation. This establishes that σ∗ remains incentive compatible.
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t) for all s
t, t ≤ τ.
In particular, ˜ vσ(z0,θ0) = vσ(z0,θ0), so that the result follows from incentive compatibility of
the original allocation.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Hence, we have that
˜ va(s
τ) ≤ ˜ va∗(s
τ) = va∗(s
τ) for all a,
a∗ is optimal from period τ onward and delivers the same continuation utility as previously.
For any plan a deﬁne an alternative plan ˆ a that switches to a∗ from period τ onward:
ˆ a(st) = a(st) for t < τ and ˆ a(st) = a∗(st) for t ≥ τ. The result above implies that
˜ va(s0) ≤ ˜ vˆ a(s0) = vˆ a(s0) ≤ va∗(s0) = ˜ va∗(s0). (45)
That is, ˆ a dominates a and yields the same utility as without the variation, which in turn
is dominated by the recommended action a∗ which also yields the same utility as after the
variation. This establishes that a∗ remains incentive compatible.
Proof of Proposition 6


























where r is deﬁned by r = q−1 − 1. Therefore, the following optimality condition must hold:
(1 − β)u(ct) = βru(CE(vt+1 − ht)).








which is the optimality condition in the problem where the agents can borrow and save freely
at the interest rate r. Transforming these two equivalent conditions into the Euler equation
in the text is straightforward.
Consider the constrained eﬃcient allocation. We can rewrite the equation that deﬁnes ∆
as a function of ∆












as a concave function of ∆. Therefore, ∆
′
≥ −r∆. Now consider giving the
agents the constrained eﬃcient allocation and allowing them to not only choose a reporting
strategy but also to borrow and save between history sτ and subsequent periods. The following




   
   
c(sτ) + ∆ for st = sτ
c(st) + r∆ for t > τ and st ≻ sτ
c(st) otherwise
Since ∆
′ ≥ −r∆, whatever reporting strategy the agent chooses when these variations are
permissible, he will always achieve lower utility than under the same reporting strategy if he
were given the variations allowed for the planner. Since the constrained eﬃcient allocation
is incentive compatible, he cannot achieve higher utility than under the constrained eﬃcient
allocation without any additional saving or borrowing. Generalizing that argument to any
history sτ, this proves the proposition.
31Proof of Proposition 7
When consumption is a geometric random walk and ht is constant, it is possible to derive
lifetime utility in closed form:









The key feature that delivers this result is the homogeneity of agents’ preferences. For a
given ¯ h, a proportional shift in consumption today moves consumption in every future period
by a proportional factor, thereby shifting lifetime utility in consumption equivalent units by
the same multiplicative factor. The constant disutility ¯ h on the other hand, acts exactly like
a discount factor. Hence utility in consumption equivalent units vt is directly proportional
to consumption and to the disutility from eﬀort or work. This is reminiscent of the static
settings in section 2.1 and 2.2.
It is then easy to guess an verify that the solution proposed in Proposition 7 both preserves
the level of utility and satisﬁes the constrained-optimality condition.
Proof of Proposition 10
Before proving this proposition, it is useful to establish the following Lemma.
Lemma 2. Consider the allocation in Proposition 10. We can write ˜ vt = ˜ Vtvi
t where vi
t is the
lifetime utility derived from {ci
t,¯ h} : vi
t = A¯ hci











































holds. Decomposing ˜ c
1−ρ
t into the product ˜ Ctci


















32This is the standard Euler equation that is trivially veriﬁed by the solution of the neoclas-
sical growth problem (41). This concludes the proof of Proposition 10.
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